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Abstract 
 
Instruments chosen to pursue climate related targets are not always efficient. In this paper we 
consider an economy with three climate related targets for its electricity generation: a given 
share of “green” electricity, a given expansion of “green” electricity, and a given reduction of 
“black” (fossil based) electricity. At its disposal the country has three instruments: an allowance 
system (tradable green certificates), a subsidy system (feed-in tariffs) and a Pigouvian fossil tax. 
Each of these instruments may be used to attain any of the given targets. Within the setting of 
the model it is verified that each kind of the target has only a single efficient instrument under 
certainty, and that there is a deadweight loss of using other instruments to achieve the target. 
Similarly, there is also an analysis of instrument choice when several targets are to be attained at 
the same time. The paper also discusses the case of simultaneous targets as well as the relevance 
of the various targets. 
JEL-Codes: C700, Q280, Q420, Q480. 
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1. Introduction 
Many countries have targets and measures to address the climate change problem. 
The targets come in different forms:  targets on greenhouse gas reduction, targets on 
shares of renewable energy (e.g. Denmark) and targets on green energy generation 
(e.g. Norway and Sweden). Along with these targets several measures and instruments 
are proposed and put into use: CO2 taxes (or emission permits), allowances (tradable 
green certificates
5
) and feed- in tariffs/ feed-in premiums. In principle, each of these 
instruments may be applied to attain each of the targets, but they are not necessarily 
equally efficient. In an analytic model designed for an electricity market, we show 
that each target has only one single efficient instrument. Hence, choosing the wrong 
instrument to attain a target will result in a loss to society. These are basic and 
straightforward results that should not be forgotten in deciding on which instruments 
to use. However, the results need to be verified and the objectives of the targets need 
to be evaluated. An analysis of this kind seems relevant for many economies both 
within the EU, the USA and for large economies such as China and India.    
 
Within the EU and the EEA, targets on greenhouse gas emission, share of renewables 
and green energy generation are generally governed by the specific EU 2020 and 
2030 policies on energy use. Hence, for 2020 the target is to reduce CO2 emission by 
20% compared to the level of 1990 and to increase the share of renewables to 20% 
(EU-COM, 2010). For 2030 the corresponding numbers are 40% and 27%, 
respectively (EU-Com, 2014)
6
. For the electricity market all EU member states and 
participating EEA countries are included in a common emission permit market for 
CO2, the EU emission trading system (ETS). With respect to the targets on green 
electricity the EU/EEA member states are at liberty of choosing a share target or a 
specific green generation capacity target and to decide which instruments to use to 
attain those targets. Some countries focus mainly on the renewable share target (e.g. 
Denmark) while others use quantitative expansion of green generation capacity (e.g. 
Norway and Sweden). With respect to the instruments applied some countries use a 
                                                 
5
 Green certificate systems are in use in several countries, e.g., the UK (“Renewable Obligation 
Certificates”, Norway and Sweden (“elsertifikater”) and the US (“Renewable Portfolio Standards”), 
6
 In addition the EU has common targets on energy efficiency and energy savings both for the period 
up to 2020 and up to 2030. However, no country specific targets or instruments are determined.  
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single instrument (e.g. the common allowance system for Norway and Sweden) while 
some countries combine several instruments (e.g. the UK).
7
  
 
A similar picture to that of the EU is valid for the USA. For instance, California has a 
target of 40% reduction of greenhouse gases by 2030 as compared with 1990 and a 
target of 50% share of renewables in electricity generation by 2030 (California 
Government, 2015, Senate Bill 350). To achieve those targets both emission permits 
(cap and trade programs) and tradable green certificates (renewable portfolio 
standards) are in use. Otherwise, regional cooperation between states is important. 
California cooperates with British Columbia, Ontario, Quebec and Manitoba through 
the Western Climate Initiative to develop harmonized cap and trade programs. Similar 
programs are also in use in several Northeast Eastern states through the so-called 
Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI).    
 
According to China’s Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC) plan submitted to 
the UNFCCC for the Paris Agreement China has targets of peaking CO2 emissions by 
2030, lowering the carbon intensity of GDP by 60%–65% below 2005 levels by 2030, 
and increasing the share of non-fossil energy to around 20% by that time. Measures 
and instruments in use are primarily specific plans to restrict coal consumption and 
specific support to increase renewable capacity. However, an initiative to develop a 
nationwide carbon emission trading market is also taken. According to India’s NDC 
India has targets to lower the emissions intensity of GDP by 33% to 35% by 2030 
below 2005 levels, and to increase the share of non-fossil based power generation 
capacity to 40% of installed electric power capacity by 2030 (equivalent to 26–30% 
of generation in 2030). India’s measures and instruments to achieve the targets are 
mainly in the category of production plans and direct investments, but India has also 
                                                 
7
 In the UK, the generation of electricity from renewable sources is supported through a 
combination of a feed-in tariff system, Contracts for Difference system, a quota system in 
terms of a quota obligation and a certificate system and a tax mechanism. In Germany, 
electricity from renewable sources is mainly supported through a market premium determined 
through a tendering scheme, while smaller plants can benefit from a feed-in tariff. In France, 
electricity from renewable sources is promoted through a feed-in tariff, a premium tariff as 
well as through tenders for the definition of the premium tariff level. Additionally, tax 
benefits are also available.  
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an emerging cap and trade market and a green certificate market (a Renewable Energy 
Certificate trading system).   
 
Hence, many economies around the world have similar climate related targets as well 
as make use of similar instruments. The instruments in question are well investigated. 
There exists an abundant literature on the functioning of black certificate (emission 
permit) systems (see, e.g., Ellerman, 2010). In addition, a sizable literature on green 
certificate system has emerged. Some of the literature addresses the interplay between 
the green certificate market and the electricity market (e.g. Nese, 2003; Amundsen, 
Baldursson and Mortensen, 2006; Fischer, 2009; Amundsen and Nese, 2009; Fischer 
and Preonas, 2010), while some consider the electricity market, the black certificate 
market and the green certificate market (e.g., Amundsen and Mortensen, 2001, 2002; 
Unger and Ahlgren, 2005; Böhringer and Rosendahl, 2010). Furthermore, some 
analyze the coexistence between an electricity market, a black certificate market and 
feed-in tariffs. Recently, some literature has emerged addressing all certificate 
systems taken together (Meran and Wittmann, 2012). Feed-in tariffs and feed-in 
premiums are also well analyzed, e.g. Traber and Kemfert (2009) analyze the 
relationship between feed-in tariffs and the CO2 permit market, while Dressler (2016) 
investigates how feed-in tariffs and feed-in premiums interplay with electricity market 
with respect to market power exertion.  
  
Hence, how these instruments function is well known, but what we seek here is to 
investigate how the instruments perform with respect to achieving the targets at least 
cost to society. The plan of the paper is as follows. Section 2 introduces an analytical 
model and section 3 presents the targets and analyzes what characterizes the socially 
first best solutions. Section 4 presents the instruments and section 5 studies how each 
of the targets may be obtained by using each of the instruments while calculating the 
social surplus. Section 6 discusses the results and the objectives of the targets, 
whereas section 7 concludes and summarizes the paper.      
 
2. Basic model 
In order to analyze the relationship between targets and instruments, we consider a 
basic model for an electricity market. It is assumed that electricity producers supply a 
common wholesale market within which a single wholesale electricity price is 
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established. Electricity generation is based on both fossil fuel (“black” electricity) and 
on renewable sources (“green” electricity). Retailers purchase electricity on the 
wholesale market. The electricity is further distributed to end-users and a single end-
user price is established. For simplicity distribution is assumed to be costless.  Perfect 
competition is assumed to prevail all around with many producers of black and green 
electricity, many retailers and many end-users of electricity. Hence, all agents treat 
the various prices as given by the market.  
 
We apply the following symbols and functional relationships. 
p End-user price of electricity 
q Wholesale price of electricity 
y Generation of "black" electricity 
z Generation of "green" electricity 
x Total consumption of electricity, where zyx   
)(xp : Inverse demand function of electricity, where 0')/)((  pxxp  
)(ycc  : Industry cost function
8
 for black electricity, where 0)(' 


yc
y
c
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0)(''
2
2



yc
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c
  
:)(zhh  Industry cost function for green electricity, where 0)(' 


zh
z
h
 and 
0)(''
2
2



zh
z
h 9
. 
(.) : Profit function 
  
 
                                                 
8
 The industry cost function is derived by “horizontal addition” of individual cost functions i.e. cost 
minimization of aggregate market supply. The reason for using the industry cost function is that we 
avoid messy notation for describing individual decisions. Our prime interest is with the equilibrium 
market solution and not with individual decisions as such.  However, not very much is lost by this 
approach as individual first order conditions for electricity producers correspond directly to those 
derived in the analysis.  
    
9
 Black electricity plants (e.g. coal fired power plants) may well be replicated at constant cost whereas 
green electricity generation from e.g. wind power typically is restricted by Nature’s varying supply of 
good sites for wind mills. For this reason we assume an increasing marginal industry cost function for 
green electricity plants. Observe that short run marginal cost of wind power is close to zero (i.e. from 
existing plants). However in this paper we consider new capacity for green electricity generation.   
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Base case 
Without any targets and instruments the producers act as if they jointly maximize 
 
)()()(),( zhyczyqzy  . 
 
The first order condition for black electricity and green electricity generation is
)(' ycq  and )(' zhq  , respectively. Hence, this is the very basic case where 
marginal generation costs should be the same for the two generation technologies. As 
there are no distribution costs by assumption we have: )(')(')( zhycxp  .  For later 
use we denote the optimal solution of this basic problem by *0x ,
*
0y ,
*
0z . 
                                                                                
3. Targets 
In the following we consider optimal social solutions for a planner facing each of 
three targets: a share target, a target of green electricity expansion and a target of 
black electricity reduction.   
 
Target of a given share of green electricity  
Assume the objective of a social planner is to attain a target of a given share   of 
renewable energy and - to have an interesting problem- that *0
*
0 xz  at the outset. 
The social planner’s problem is then to maximize: 
 
)()()(),( zhycxxpzy  , subject to: xz  , xy )1(   
                    
Upon substitution, the first order condition for this maximization problem is seen to 
be equal to 
 
(1)  )(')(')1()( zhycxp    
 
This condition says that the end user price should be equal to a linear (or convex) 
combination of marginal costs with the percentage target as a weight. For later use we 
denote the optimal solution for this target by *x ,
*
y ,
*
z . Observe, that with the 
assumed functional forms and the constraints xz   and xy )1(  , the solution
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*
x ,
*
y ,
*
z  is a unique solution to this optimization problem.  The social surplus
10
 for 
this target is 
    
**
0
**
0
* )())1(()())('))1((')1()(

 
xx
xhxcdxxpdxxhxcxpW  
 
Target of a given expansion of green electricity 
Assume the objective of the social planner is to attain a target of a given quantity z of 
renewable energy and assume that the unregulated quantity of green electricity is less 
than the regulator’s target (i.e. zz *0 ). The social planner’s problem is then to 
maximize: 
 
)()()(),( zhycxxpzy  , subject to: zz  .  
 
Denoting the shadow price of the constraint by   the first order condition is equal to 
 
(2)  )(')(')( zhycxp  
 
 As 0 for a binding constraint, the marginal cost for green electricity should 
exceed that of black electricity. We denote the optimal solution for this target by *zx , 
*
zy ,
** , zz zz  . Observe that with the assumed functional forms and the constraint this 
solution is a unique solution to this optimization problem. The social surplus for this 
target is 
 
*
0
** )()()(
zx
zz zhzxcdxxpW  
 
Target of a given reduction of black electricity 
Assume that the objective of the social planner is to reduce the emission of 2CO
stemming from the generation of black electricity to a certain level and, for simplicity, 
that there is a one to one relationship between the generation of black electricity and 
the emission of 2CO . Let further y denote the corresponding target of black electricity 
                                                 
10
 The social surpluses calculated in the following do not include the possible social gains of the 
regulation (e.g. the value of the internalization of a negative externality). For a given target such a gain 
will be the same for all instruments that attain that target.  
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generation, and assume that the unregulated quantity of black electricity is larger than 
the regulator’s target (i.e. yy *0 ). The social planner’s problem is then to maximize: 
 
)()()(),( zhycxxpzy  , subject to: yy  .  
 
Denoting the shadow price of the constraint by   the first order condition is equal to 
 
(3) )(')(')( zhycxp    
 
 As 0 for a binding constraint, the marginal cost for black electricity should be 
smaller than that of green electricity. We denote the optimal solution for this target by
*
yx , yy y 
*
,
** , yyz  . Observe that with the assumed functional forms and the constraint 
this solution is a unique solution to this optimization problem. The social surplus for 
this target is 
 
*
0
** )()()(
yx
yy yxhycdxxpW  
 
4. Instruments 
In order to attain the targets the social planner is assumed to have three instruments at 
disposal: a tradable green certificates system denoted, TGC, a unit subsidy (feed-in 
tariff) denoted, , and a unit tax on black electricity denoted, . The functioning of 
the last two instruments are well known, but the nature of the first mentioned 
instrument needs some explanation.   
 
Tradable Green Certificates (TGC) 
As for any other market the markets for TGCs consist of suppliers and buyers. 
Suppliers are the producers of green electricity that receive an amount of TGCs 
corresponding to the amount of green electricity they generate. The suppliers thus 
may sell these TGCs on the TGC market. Hence, the producers receive in this way 
both the wholesale price and the TGC price per MWh green electricity generated. 
Buyers of TGCs are the retailers/consumers that are obliged by the government to 
keep a certain share ("the percentage requirement", ) of TGCs out of total electricity 
consumed (i.e. the sum of green and black electricity). Thus, the demand for TGCs is 
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simply derived as a percentage of the total end use demand for electricity. On the 
basis of supply and demand a single TGC price, denoted, s , is established.  With a 
large number of retailers the equilibrium established in the market (i.e. the 
competitive equilibrium) must be characterized by:  
 
 (4) sqp  .                                                                                                     
 
We assume the amount of TGCs is measured in the same units as the amount of green 
electricity. Thus, the demand of TGCs is given by xg d   and the supply of TGCs is 
given by zg s  .                                                                                                           
 
5. Attaining a single  target by various instruments     
In this section we consider how the targets may be attained by applying the various 
instruments.  
 
5.1 Target of a given share of green electricity  
In this case the objective of the social planner is to attain a target of a given share   
of renewable electricity. From expression 1) we know that the optimality condition 
for this case is that price should be equal to a linear combination of the marginal 
generation costs of the two technologies with the share  as weight.  
 
Using a TGC-system to attain the share target 
 
With this instrument the producers act as if they seek to maximize 
 
  )()()( zhyczsqqyx  . 
 
The first order condition for black and green electricity generation is:   )(' ycq  and                                                                                                    
)(' zhsq  , respectively. Denoting the market solution of this case by 
*** ,, TGCTGCTGC zyx  ,
** , TGCTGC sq  the equilibrium of the two markets is thus 
characterized by 
 
10 
 
 (5)    
*** )( TGCTGCTGC sqxp   .                                                
(6)    



*
**** TGC
TGCTGCTGC
z
zyx  .                                           
(7)    )(' ** TGCTGC ycq     .                                                
(8)    )(' *** TGCTGCTGC zhsq    .                                                  
 
Inserting 6), 7) and 8) in 5), we find that the end-user price in equilibrium may be 
written as a linear combination of the marginal cost of black and green electricity: 
 
(9) )(')(')1()(
***
TGCTGCTGC zhycxp      .                  
 
From (6) we see that ** TGCTGC xz   and that
** )1( TGCTGC xy   . Also we see that 
(9) is exactly equal to (1), wherefore we conclude that the TGC system is an optimal 
instrument for attaining the target of a given share of renewables (i.e. 
****** ,,  zzyyxx TGCTGCTGC  ). Therefore, denoting the social surplus for this 
target when using the TGC instrument by *TGCW , we must have
**
 WW TGC  . 
 
Using a feed–in tariff to attain the share target 
In this case a feed-in tariff  is given per unit of green electricity generated in order to 
attain the share target. The effect of a feed-in tariff is to make green electricity more 
profitable and black electricity relatively less profitable such that a substitution takes 
place in production and makes the share of green electricity higher. In this case the 
producers act as if they seek to maximize  
 
zzhycxxp    )()()(  
 
We denote the market solution of this case by *** ,,  zyx ,
*
 , where the symbol 
*
 signifies the subsidy necessary to increase the share of renewables such that the 
-target is attained. The first order conditions of this solution is 
 
(10) 
**** )(')(')(   zhycxp  
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Clearly, this condition does not satisfy (1).  To see this, observe that   
)(')(')1())('()(')1()(')(')( *********   zhyczhyczhycxp   
Hence, the first order necessary condition for obtaining a given share of renewables in 
an optimal way (efficiently) is not satisfied when using a feed-in tariff. In fact, it turns 
out that too much electricity is generated by using such a subsidy system as compared 
with what is socially optimal in order to attain the share target, i.e.: 
****** ,,  zzyyxx  . To see this, assume the opposite, i.e.
**
 xx   and 
seek a contradiction. Observe that this assumption also implies **** ,  zzyy  , as 
the  -share is satisfied with both instruments. As 0)(' xp , it then follows that
)()( **  xpxp  . Next, observe again that ))('()(')1()(
****
   zhycxp  and 
from (1) that )()(')1()(
***
  zhycxp  . Hence, the contradictory assumption 
implies that )(')(')1()())('()(')1()(
*******
  zhycxpzhycxp  . 
Rearranging terms we find that 0))(')('())(')(')(1(
*****    zhzhycyc . 
However, this is a contradiction due to the assumed convexity of the cost functions 
and the contradictory assumption that **** ,  zzyy  (implying )(')('
**
 ycyc   
and )(')('
**
 zhzh  ). Hence, we must have 
****** ,,  zzyyxx  . For this 
solution the social surplus is  
   *
0
**
*
))('())1((')1()( 

 ldxxhxcxpW
x
   
The symbol *l represents the lump sum value of the total subsidy (i.e. 
***
  zl  ) 
that comes from outside of the electricity sector and therefore has to be subtracted in 
calculating the social surplus using this instrument. Rewriting the expression for the 
social surplus we find  
 
*
0
*** )())1(()(

 
x
xhxcdxxpW  
We know that *xx  maximizes this expression. Therefore, as 
**
 xx  , we must 
have **  WW  . 
 
 
 
12 
 
Using a tax to attain the share target 
In this case a tax  is levied per unit of the black electricity generated in order to 
attain the share target. The effect of a tax on black electricity is to make green 
electricity relatively more profitable and black electricity relatively less profitable 
such that a substitution takes place in production and makes the share of green 
electricity higher. In this case the producers act as if they seek to maximize  
 
yzhycxxp    )()()(  
 
We denote the market solution of this case by *** ,,  zyx ,
*
 , where the symbol 
*

signifies the tax necessary to reduce the share of black electricity such that the  -
target is attained. The first order condition of this solution is 
 
(11) )(')(')(
****
  zhycxp   
 
Clearly, this condition does not satisfy (1). To see this, observe that   
)(')(')1()('))(')(1()(')(')( *********   zhyczhyczhycxp   
Hence, the first order necessary condition for obtaining a given share of renewables in 
an optimal way (efficiently) is not satisfied when using a tax. In fact, it turns out that 
too little electricity is generated by using a tax system as compared with what is 
socially optimal in order to attain the share target, i.e.: ****** ,,  zzyyxx  . 
To see this, seek a contradiction and assume the opposite, i.e. **  xx  . Observe that 
this assumption also implies **** ,  zzyy  , as the  -share is satisfied using both 
instruments. As 0)(' xp , it follows that )()( **  xpxp  . Next, observe again that   
 )('))(')(1()(')(')(
*******
  zhyczhycxp  , and from (1) that 
)()(')1()( ***   zhycxp  . Hence, the contradictory assumption implies that 
)(')(')1()()('())(')(1()( *******   zhycxpzhycxp  . Rearranging 
terms we find that 0)1())(')('())(')(')(1(
*****    zhzhycyc . However, 
this is a contradiction due to the assumed convexity of the cost functions and the 
contradictory assumption that **** ,  zzyy  (implying )(')('
**
 ycyc   and 
13 
 
)(')(' **  zhzh  ) Hence, we must have 
****** ,,  zzyyxx  . For this solution 
the social surplus is  
   *
0
**
*
)('))1((')1()( 

 ldxxhxcxpW
x
   
The symbol *l represents the lump sum value of the total tax (i.e. 
***
  zl  ) 
subtracted from the electricity sector and that therefore has to be added in calculating 
the social surplus using this instrument. Rewriting the expression for the social 
surplus we find  
 
*
0
*** )())1(()(

 
x
xhxcdxxpW  
We know that *xx  maximizes this expression. Therefore, as
**
 xx  , we must 
have **  WW  . 
 
 
5.2. Target of a given expansion of green electricity 
In this case the objective of the social planner is to attain a target of a given quantity 
z of renewable energy.  From expression 2) we know that the optimality condition for 
this case is that price should be equal to the marginal cost of green electricity minus a 
shadow price of the constraint and also equal to the marginal cost of black electricity.  
 
Using a TGC-system to attain the target of a given expansion of green electricity 
For this instrument the problem of the social planner is to determine the size of the 
percentage requirement  that induces the market to achieve a quantity of green 
electricity that is equal to z .
11
  We denote this percentage requirement by *z and the 
market solution using this instrument by zzyx TGCzTGCzTGCz 
*** ,, , ** , TGCzTGCz sq . From 
section 5.1., we know that the market solution for this instrument must be 
characterized by the following optimality conditions 
 
                                                 
11
 The idea is that green electricity may be stimulated by increasing the size of the percentage 
requirement. However, further assumptions on the functional forms of both the generation costs and the 
demand function are needed to ensure this (see Amundsen and Mortensen, 2001). These assumptions 
are reasonable and realistic when considering specific electricity markets (see Amundsen and Bye, 
2016 for the case of the Norwegian electricity market).   
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(12) )(')(')1()(
**** zhycxp zTGCzzTGCz      
 
We also know that *TGCzxz  and that
** )1( TGCzTGCz xy  . 
 
Clearly, condition (12) does not satisfy the optimality condition as seen from the point 
of view of the social planner, i.e. condition (2). In fact we will have  
 
******* )(')(')()(')(')1()( zzzzTGCzzTGCz zhycxpzhycxp    
 
From this it also follows that ** zTGCz xx  . To see this, assume that the opposite is true 
and seek a contradiction, i.e. assume 
 
***** )(')(')(')(')1( zzzTGCzz zhyczhyc    
This assumption also implies ** zTGCz xx   and
**
zTGCz yy  . Rearrange this expression 
and find 
 
0))(')('()(')(' ****  TGCzzzTGCz yczhycyc   
 
Inspection of signs show that this is a contradiction as the left hand side of the 
expression is strictly positive i.e. )(')(' ** zTGCz ycyc  and 0)(')('
**  TGCzTGCz syczh  . 
Hence, we must have ** zTGCz xx  and
**
zTGCz yy  . With this solution the social surplus 
may be written 
 
 
**
0
*
0
****
ˆ
* )()()()())1(()(
TGCzTGCz x
TGCz
x
TGCzTGCzTGCzzTGCz zhzxcdxxpxhxcdxxpW 
 
 
We know that *zxx  maximizes this expression. Therefore, as 
**
zTGCz xx  it follows 
that ** zTGCz WW  .  
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Using a feed-in tariff to attain the target of a given expansion of green electricity 
In this case a feed-in tariff  is given per unit of the green electricity generated in 
order to attain the target. We denote the market solution by zzyx zzz 
*** ,,  ,
*
z , 
where the symbol *z signifies the feed-in tariff necessary to increase the quantity of 
green electricity such that the z -target is attained. We know from earlier that the 
market solution must be characterized by  
 
(13) 
*** )(')(')( zzz zhycxp    
 
Comparing (13) with (2) we see that a feed-in tariff *z  equal to the shadow price 
*
z
will efficiently induce the optimal solution as seen from the point of view of the social 
planner, i.e. zzzyyxx zzzzz 
****** ,,  . Hence, not unexpectedly, we find that a 
feed-in tariff on green electricity generation will efficiently achieve the target of 
expanding the generation of green electricity. Denoting the social surplus using this 
instrument by *zW , we find that 
**
zz WW  . 
 
 
Using a tax on black electricity to attain the target of a given expansion of green 
electricity  
In this case a tax  is levied per unit of the black electricity generated in order to 
attain the target. The effect of a tax on black electricity is to make green electricity 
relatively more profitable and black electricity relatively less profitable such that a 
substitution takes place in production and stimulates green electricity generation
12
. 
We denote the market solution by *** ,,  zzz zyx ,
*
z , where the symbol 
*
z signifies the 
tax necessary to increase the quantity of green electricity such that the z -target is 
attained. We know from earlier that the market solution must be characterized by  
 
(14) )(')(')(
*** zhycxp zzz    
                                                 
12
 Formally, we need to show that a tax on black electricity will actually increase the quantity generated 
of green electricity and not only increase the relative share. It turns out that the condition for having a 
positive increase of green electricity is: 0))('/)('')('')('')(''(  xpzhycyhzc  . This 
condition is satisfied under the assumptions of the model.  
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Comparing (14) with (2), we see that
*
*
** )(')()(')( zzz zhxpzhxp   . Hence, using a 
tax to attain the target does not give rise to the optimal solution as seen from the point 
of view of view of the social planner. Clearly, we find that both total electricity 
generation as well as the generation of black electricity is too small as compared what 
is regulatory optimal, i.e. ** zz xx   and 
**
zz yy  . After adding the lump sum value of 
the total tax revenue to compensate for the tax take, the social surplus using this 
instrument is equal to 
 
*
0
** )()()(


zx
zz zhzxcdxxpW  
We know that *zxx  maximizes this expression. Therefore, as
**
zz xx  , we must have 
**
zz WW  . 
 
 
5.3. Target of a given reduction of black electricity 
In this case the objective of the social planner is to reduce the generation of black 
electricity to attain a level y of renewable energy.  From expression 3) we know that 
the optimality condition for this case is that price should be equal to the marginal cost 
of black electricity plus the shadow price of the constraint and also equal to the 
marginal cost of green electricity.  
 
Using a TGC-system to attain the target of a given reduction of black electricity 
For this instrument the problem of the social planner is to determine the size of the 
percentage requirement  that induces the market to achieve a quantity of black 
electricity that is equal to y .
13
  We denote this percentage requirement by 
*
y and the 
market solution using this instrument by
*** ,, TGCyTGCyTGCy zyyx  ,
** , TGCyTGCy sq . From 
section 5.1., we know that the market solution for this instrument must be 
characterized by the following optimality conditions 
 
(15) )(')(')1()(
****
TGCyyyTGCy zhycxp      
 
                                                 
13
 Under the assumptions of the model it is a clear cut result that the generation of black electricity will 
fall as the size of the percentage requirement is increasing (see Amundsen and Mortensen, 2002).  
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We also know that
**
TGCyTGCy xz  , and that
*)1( TGCyxy  .  
 
Generally, condition (15) does not satisfy the optimality condition as seen from the 
point of view of the social planner, i.e. condition (3). In fact we will have  
 
)(')(')()(')(')1()( ******* yyyTGCyyyTGCy zhycxpzhycxp    
 
From this it also follows that
**
yTGCy xx  and
**
yTGCy zz  . To see this, assume the 
opposite is true and seek a contradiction, i.e. assume 
 
)()(')(')())(')('()(')( ***** yczhycxpyczhycxp yyTGCyyTGCy    
 
This assumption also implies that 
**
yTGCy xx  and
**
yTGCy zz  . As this implies 
)(')(' ** yTGCy zhzh  and as 10
*  y , we clearly have a contradiction. Hence, we must 
have 
**
yTGCy xx  and
**
yTGCy zz  . With this solution the social surplus may be written 
 
 
**
0
*
0
***** )()()()())1(()(
TGCzTGCy x
TGCy
x
TGCyTGCyTGCyyTGCy yxhycdxxpxhxcdxxpW 
 
 
We know that 
*
yxx  maximizes this expression. Therefore, as 
**
yTGCy xx  it follows 
that
**
yTGCy WW  .  
 
 
Using a feed-in tariff on green electricity to attain the target of a given reduction of 
black electricity 
In this case a feed-in tariff  is given per unit of the green electricity generated in 
order to attain the target. We denote the market solution by
*** ,,  yyy zyyx  ,
*
y , 
where the symbol 
*
y signifies the feed-in tariff necessary to increase the quantity of 
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green electricity such that the y -target is attained. We know from earlier that the 
market solution must be characterized by  
 
(16) 
*** )(')(')( yyy zhycxp    
 
Comparing (16) with (3) we see that
*** )(')()(')( yyy ycxpycxp   . Hence, using a 
feed-in tariff to attain the target does not give rise to the optimal solution as seen from 
the point of view of the social planner. Clearly, we find that both total electricity 
generation as well as the generation of green electricity is too large as compared what 
is socially optimal, i.e. 
**
yy xx   and 
**
yy yz  . After subtracting the lump sum value 
of the total subsidy to compensate for the subsidy given to the electricity market, the 
social surplus using this instrument is equal to 
 
 
*
0
** )()()(


zx
yy yxhycdxxpW  
We know that 
*
yxx  maximizes this expression. Therefore, as 
**
yy xx  we must have 
**
yy WW  . 
 
Using a tax on black electricity to attain the target of a given reduction of black 
electricity 
In this case a tax  is levied per unit of the black electricity generated in order to 
attain the target. We denote the market solution by
*** ,,  yyy zyyx  ,
*
y , where the 
symbol 
*
y signifies the tax necessary to reduce the quantity of black electricity such 
that the y -target is attained. We know from earlier that the market solution must be 
characterized by  
 
(16) )(')(')(
**
  yyy zhycxp   
 
Comparing (16) with (3), we see that a tax
*
y  set equal to the shadow price 
*
y will 
efficiently induce the optimal solution as seen from the point of view of the social 
planner, i.e. 
***** ,, yzyyy zzyyxx   . Hence, not unexpectedly, we find that a tax 
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on black electricity generation will efficiently achieve the target of reducing the 
generation of black electricity. Hence, denoting the social surplus using this 
instrument by
*
yW , we must have
**
yy WW  . 
 
6. Simultaneously attaining several targets by various instruments 
 
Next, we turn to the case of simultaneously attainment of the proposed targets. Hence, 
we assume that the generation of green electricity should be at least as large as a given 
target, z and simultaneously that the generation of black electricity should not be 
larger than a given target, y .  
 
The social planner’s optimization problem is  
 
)()()(),(max zhycxxpzy  , subject to: zz   and yy   
 
Denoting the shadow prices of green and black electricity by  and  , respectively, 
the following first order conditions must simultaneously be satisfied 
 
(17)   )(')(')( zhycxp  
 
We denote the optimal solution for these targets by: 
***** ,,,, yzyzyzyzyz zzyyx  . 
 
Clearly, attaining both targets with a single instrument is not generally feasible 
(Tinbergen, 1952). A subsidy of green electricity could be designed to achieve the 
green target, but could only by chance attain the black target at the same time, just as 
a tax on black electricity could be designed to  attain the target on black electricity but 
only by chance attain the green target (i.e. depending on a specific constellation of 
parameters). Hence, normally two targets call for two instruments.  
 
Still, one may wonder whether a TGC system alone with an announced percentage 
requirement of )/( zyz  could attain the two targets. The answer is that it will 
(generally) not. To see this, consider equation (9). From this we have 
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(18) )(')(')1()(
***
TGCTGCTGC zhycxp      .                  
 
From (6) we also have ** TGCTGC xz   and that
** )1( TGCTGC xy   . To see that, 
generally, zzzyyyzyxx yzTGCyzTGCyzTGC 
****** ,,  , apply (17) to obtain  
 
(19) 
**
***
)1()(')(')1(
))('())(')(1()(
yzyz
yzyzyz
zhyc
zhycxp




 
 
Hence, we see that only if: 
**)1( yzyz   , will 
zzyyzyxx TGCTGCyzTGC 
**** ,,  . Otherwise if: 
**)1( yzyz   , then 
zzyyzyxx TGCTGCyzTGC 
**** ,,  and if: 
**)1( yzyz   , then 
zzyyzyxx TGCTGCyzTGC 
**** ,,  . 
 
Searching for two instruments that may optimally attain the two targets, a 
combination of a tax and a subsidy seems to be a natural choice. Denoting the tax by 
yz and the subsidy by yzˆ the optimization problem reads 
 
zyzhycxxpzy yzyz   )()()(),(max  
 
The first order conditions related to this problem is 
 
yzyzyzyzyz zhycxp    )(')(')(
*
ˆ
**
 
 
Clearly by setting 
*
yzzy   and 
*
yzzy   , the above first order conditions are seen to 
be identical to the social optimality conditions. Hence, we must have yy yz 
*
  and 
zz yz 
*
 i.e. the combination of a tax and a subsidy may optimally achieve the targets 
on black and green electricity
14
.  
 
 
7. Discussion 
The main message of this paper is that each kind of environmental target has a single 
optimal instrument, and that there is a deadweight loss of using other instruments to 
                                                 
14
 It turns out that a combination of a TGC-system and a tax may also achieve the targets 
simultaneously, if the percentage requirement is set to )/( yzz  , and the tax is equal to 
*** ))1/(( yzyzyz    .  
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achieve the target. (See summary of results in Table 1.).Yet, many countries apply 
instruments that are not optimal in relation to the stated targets. For example Norway 
uses a system of tradable green certificates (jointly with Sweden) to attain a quantity 
target of new capacity installation of green electricity.
15
 Clearly, according to the 
analysis it would be better to use a feed-in system. Furthermore, Denmark uses a feed-
in premium system financed by a PSO
16
system to basically attain a share target on 
renewables
17
. From the analysis it would be better to use an allowance system based 
on tradable certificates.  However, many countries have not only one climate related 
target, but several targets that they seek to attain by using several instruments at the 
same time.
18
 This raises the question as to what the purposes of the targets are and 
which market failures they are intended to address.   
 
 
Table1. Optimal solutions of applying various instruments to achieve various targets 
 
 Share target:    Green target: z   Black target: y

 
Allowances: 
TGC 
**
 WW TGC  ,
**
 xx TGC   
**** ,  zzyy TGCTGC   
**
zTGCz WW  ,
**
zTGCz xx   
zzyy TGCzzTGCz 
*** ,  
**
yTGCy WW  ,
**
yTGCy xx   
*** , yTGCyTGCy zzyy   
Green 
subsidy:  
**
 WW  ,
**
 xx   
**** ,  zzyy   
**
zz WW  ,
**
zz xx   
zzyy zzz 
*** ,   
**
yy WW  ,
**
yy xx   
*** , yyy zzyy    
Black tax:  **
 WW  ,
**
 xx   
**** ,  zzyy   
**
zz WW  ,
**
zz xx   
zzyy zzz 
*** ,   
**
yy WW  ,
**
yy xx   
*** , yyy zzyy    
 
 
The stated purposes for adopting the various regulatory instruments may be many and 
range from the regulation of market failures to environmental preservation, job 
                                                 
15
 The joint Norwegian-Swedish target is to attain new renewable capacity of 28.4 TWh by 2020.  
16
 The Danish feed-in premium system amounts to giving new renewable energy - mainly offshore 
wind power projects - a guaranteed price, i.e. if the wholesale price of electricity is low, the necessary 
feed-in premium  will be high and vice versa. The system is financed by a PSO (Public Service 
Obligation) system that charges the electricity consumers with a varying unit fee to be paid over the 
electricity bill. The fee varies with the wholesale price of electricity. However, Denmark is about to 
abandon the PSO-system because the EU has determined that the PSO system gives rise to unfair 
competition with respect to foreign electricity producers.  
17
 For 2020 Denmark’s target for renewables is 30 percent out of total energy use. 
18
 For instance, towards 2020, all member states of the EU has to fulfill a country specific share target 
for renewables, as well as fulfill a percentage target on the reduction of greenhouse gases in the non-
ETS sectors of the economy. For the 2030 policy the country specific targets on the share of 
renewables will be abandoned. In addition to this they have to participate in the joint ETS-system. 
Also, the EU has a common target on energy savings that the member states have to address.      
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creation and innovation with a consideration of distributional equity and political 
feasibility (Weitzman, 1974; Goulder and Parry, 2008; Fischer and Preonas, 2010).  
 
While the target of reducing the generation of fossil energy is well founded by the 
market failure related to climate change, it is not equally obvious why one needs 
specific targets on shares of renewables and on quantities of green energy (and on 
energy savings as in the EU). As illustrated by the analysis, it is true that a target on 
the share of green electricity or a specific increase of the quantity of green electricity 
may correspond to a given reduction of black electricity when TGCs and subsidies are 
applied. However, if the main objective is to reduce the generation of black 
electricity, then a Pigouvian tax or an emission permit system would be better. It 
should also be noted that a Pigouvian tax on black electricity will itself lead to an 
increase of the share of green electricity as well as of the quantity of green electricity 
generated. The question then is whether there are other kinds of market failures that 
are taken care of by the share target and the target of expanding the quantity of green 
electricity.  
 
One argument, frequently heard is that subsidies on green energy will create new jobs 
and give a country that engage in such a practice a first mover advantage in 
developing a “green” industry that may grow into a profitable export industry. 
However, lack of jobs and unprofitable industries are not normally a result of a 
market failure in the proper meaning of the term (i.e. a failure that not even a perfect 
competitive organization of the market will make go away), but rather of short and 
intermediate term economic situations. Anyhow, if the target is to stimulate the 
employment, it would be better to use more general economic instruments (e.g. 
budgetary and monetary policies) rather than to give subsidies to specific industries.  
  
Along the same lines, subsidies are considered beneficial as they are assumed to 
stimulate the research and development of new green technologies. In part, this is true 
and there is a basic economic argument for why the government should promote 
research. Technological progress benefits all and not only those who make the 
inventions and develop the technology, but also the rest of the economy that adopts 
the new technologies.  Hence, society is benefitted through so-called knowledge spill-
over effects. (see e.g. Jaffe, 1986, Jaffe et al., 1993). Therefore, there is a danger that 
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too little research would take place if research is left to the private sector alone, acting 
only in their own interest without considering the positive spill-over effects to society. 
However, stimulation of research is good for any new technological development, not 
only within the energy sector. Furthermore, the subsidies for green energy are also 
given to producers making use of established technologies where the argument of 
stimulating spill-over effects is no longer valid. Hence, this is an argument for general 
subsidies to research and not for support of a specific industry as such.
19
 Furthermore, 
it should be noted that a Pigouvian tax on fossil based electricity also will stimulate 
research in renewable energy through so-called “induced” technological change (see 
e.g. Newell et al. , 1999, Popp, 2002 and Goulder and Mathai, 2000).  
 
Yet another argument put forward for having targets on shares of renewables and of 
subsidizing green energy is that these targets may increase the security of supply. The 
point is that a country with a large dependency on imported fossil energy (coal, oil 
and natural gas) is very vulnerable if the supply of energy should disappear or become 
considerably reduced within a short interval of time. Such shocks may have a sizeable 
negative effect on the economy, just as it happened after the OPEC oi1 embargo in 
1973/74 (see Kilian 2008, 2009, and Löschel et al., 2010) The resulting increase of 
energy prices following from a supply chock of the mentioned  kind may be amplified 
by imperfections in other markets (e.g. the labour market) and give rise to 
considerable negative effects on the economy (see Baumeister et al., 2010)   
Stimulating the generation of green energy within the country as well as diversifying 
the use of energy types (possibly by trade) may lessen the dependency and increase 
the security of supply. However, uncertain and short time fluctuating energy prices as 
such do not necessarily call for governmental intervention in the energy sector. 
Uncertain and short time fluctuating prices are typical for many traded inputs and 
goods, and in general the government may deal with the more severe consequences of 
such problems by making use of budgetary policies to stabilize the economy, rather 
than to intervene in the energy market itself.      
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 A study of the knowledge spillover effects from private  research in Denmark investigated whether 
such spillover effects  were larger within the energy sector (thus calling for larger subsidies) as 
compared with other sectors of the economy (Bjørner and Machenhauer,  2011). The study found that 
this was not the case. In fact, the study suggested that the spillover effects were lower for the energy 
sector.  
24 
 
Furthermore, another meaning of the term “security of supply” needs to be mentioned, 
namely the degree of which one can make sure that “the light will stay on”. In this 
sense the increasing dependency on intermittent power (i.e. from wind energy), will 
worsen the security of supply situation within the electricity sector, rather than 
improving it (Hirth, 2015). The increasing share of renewable energy in electricity 
generation will induce additional costs in terms of increased reserve capacity that can 
be ramped quickly possibly through new capacity markets (see e.g. Cramton et al.  
2013).  
 
The fact that many countries pursue several targets
20
 (whether they are economically 
well founded or not) implies that several instruments must be applied in order to 
achieve a maximal social surplus given the attainment of these targets. Just as the 
number of independent linear equations must be equal to the number of unknowns in 
a uniquely determined equation system, the number of instruments should ideally be 
equal to the number of targets (see Tinbergen, 1952)
21
. Instruments and targets are 
interconnected in the sense that each instrument may affect all targets and, 
consequently, each target may be affected by all instruments. Some of the instruments 
may be compatible while others may be outright counteractive (e.g. subsidizing green 
electricity will help reaching the share target for renewables, but will at the same time 
run counter to a target of increasing energy savings, through the price lowering 
effect). Also, targets may themselves be incompatible, e.g. the target on renewable 
expansion, and the target of fossil energy reduction may not necessarily correspond to 
the share target.       
 
It should be stressed that if the single overriding target is to reduce the emission of 
greenhouse gases from using fossil energy (and the other targets are set with the 
intention to promote this superior target), then, clearly, there will be a social loss from 
using several instruments to also attain the subordinate targets (i.e. too many 
irrelevant constraints).  This does, however, not mean that it is always bad to use 
several instruments to attain a single target. As shown by e.g. Roberts and Spence 
(1976) and Kwerel (1977) it may be optimal from the point of view of society to 
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 Indeed, this is true for many countries around the world, including the USA, China and India.   
21
 More precisely Jan Tinbergen’s rule can be stated in the following way: The number of goals a 
policymaker can pursue can be no greater than the number of instruments the policymaker can control. 
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combine a certificate system with an additional instrument such as floor and ceiling 
prices (a so-called “hybrid system”) when faced with uncertainty. Also, more recently 
Pizer (2003), Jacoby and Ellerman (2004), Burtraw and Palmer (2006), Goulder and 
Parry (2008) show how a system of “safety valves” (ceilings and floors prices) under 
uncertainty may increase the efficiency of a dynamic emissions certificates systems that 
allows banking.
22
 
 
Otherwise, the reasons for applying several instruments even though only the target of 
fossil energy reduction is at the forefront may generally be found within the realm of 
political economy. For example, a part of the carbon tax burden may be taken away from 
the fossil intensive industries, if subsidies to green energy do a part of the job of 
reducing the emission of CO2. Hence, the combination of instruments is not particularly 
cost effective but it is an answer to a political wish of “distributional equity”, and 
possibly also, to ideas of green job creation and first mover advantages (Goulder and 
Parry, 2008). 
 
 
7. Summary and conclusion   
In order to attain a given climate related target a social planner may choose among 
several instruments. Using a standard analytic model for an electricity market, this 
paper verifies that each kind of target (i.e. target on black or green electricity 
generation; or percentages of the two) has only a single efficient instrument (under 
certainty), and that there is a deadweight loss of using other instruments to achieve the 
target. With the same logic, the paper confirms that several simultaneous targets on 
green and black electricity generation call for several instruments. In particular, it is 
shown that a system of tradable green certificates cannot generally alone attain 
simultaneous targets on black and green electricity generation. Generally, it is a 
problem that many countries use instruments that are not optimal for the stated 
targets, wherefore there is a loss in terms of wasted resources.  
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 The logic of this result is recently adopted in the Market Stability Reserve of EU ETS, becoming active 
as of January 2019. According to this mechanism EU ETS quotas will enter into a reserve if quota prices 
tends to go below a floor price, while quotas from the reserve will be released if the quota price tends to 
rise above a given price cap. 
26 
 
This paper also discusses the relevance of the various climate targets that a country 
may have i.e. what kind of market failure they are intended to deal with.  The 
discussion reveals that the economic rationales for the stated targets are not at always 
obvious. The paper also points out that there is loss to society of trying to achieve 
targets that are irrelevant as compared with an overriding target e.g. to curtail the 
emission of greenhouse gases.     
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Appendix: A simple illustrative model with numbers 
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strictly positive constants. For optimization problems and first order conditions, see 
main text. 
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Table A. Example: Optimal solutions of applying various instruments to achieve 
various targets 
 
 Share target: 6,0  Green target: 25z  Black target: 20y

 
Social 
optimum 
0,31,6,20 **   zy  
4,2502* W   
0,25,5,37 **  zz zy  
8,2843* zW  
0,25,0,20 **  yy zy  
5,2537* yW  
 
Allowances: 
TGC 
0,31,6,20 **  TGCTGC zy   
4,2502* TGCW , 3,46
* s  
0,25,1,33 **  TGCzTGCz zy  
7,2824* TGCzW ,
8,21* zs  
 
3,31,0,20 **  TGCyTGCy zy  
3,2478* TGCyW , 6,47
* ys  
 
Green 
subsidy:  
9,42,6,28 **   zy  
7,2132*W , 1,62
*   
 
0,25,5,37 **   zz zy  
8,2843* zW , 5,17
* z  
 
0,60,0,20 **   yy zy  
0,700* yW , 105
*  y  
 
Black tax:  
 
9,25,3,17 **   zy  
8,2435* W , 5,39
*   
 
0,25,0,20 **   zz zy  
5,2537*zW , 0,35
* z  
 
0,25,0,20 **   yy zy  
5,2537* yW , 35
*  z  
 
No targets: 0,41,0,18 **  zy , 0,2905* W . Parameter values applied: 
,5,2,1,100  gkba  
  
 
